Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the stagnation of ISI (import substitution industrialization) projects discredited state-led development schemes throughout the less developed world. For many countries, heavy state involvement in the economy produced inefficient bureaucracies and public enterprises riddled by corruption, inefficiencies, rent-seeking, and nepotistic practic es designed to bolster loyalty. The political imperatives of regime coalition management and survival took precedence over economic rationality, resulting in disastrous policies that failed to promote development. Trapped within a context of economic crisis, dwindling strategic rents in the post-Cold War era, and powerful networks of international neoliberal lending institutions (e.g., IMF), many statist regimes have turned to economic liberalization and reform in an effort to stave off deepening economic collapse.
These reform efforts, however, often threaten the social contract that sustains regime coalitions. In non-democratic systems in particular, market distortions are frequently used to promote political support among key social and economic actors. Patronage is channeled through targeted subsidies, investment opportunities, public employment, currency manipulation, and other interventionist policies. Economic liberalization weakens the politicization of the economy by eliminating some of these distortions through privatization and structural adjustment. As a result, while economic reform is necessary to generate resources for coalition maintenance, regimes face considerable political costs since the changes directly threaten the interests of proregime forces, who may consider defection (Nelson 1989 (Nelson , 1990 Haggard and Kaufman 1992) .
In many countries, the regime's political survival in the midst of economic reform is contingent upon the support of a seldom recognized economic actor: the military. Militaries throughout the world have substantial stakes in the economy and as a result are important actors to consider. In Central America, for example, particularly Honduras and El Salvador, the military or its pension fund own banks, insurance companies, telephone companies, shrimp businesses, hotels, and palm oil farms (Brenes and Casas 1998) . In the Ukraine, the military charges wealthy customers to operate its equipment and weapons in what amounts to "military tourism" (Shields 2001) . Through a complex web of charity organizations, foundations, holding companies, cooperatives, and criminal enterprises, the military in Indonesia operates business networks, in many cases creating self-financing territorial units in the provinces, districts, and sub-districts Prominent generals developed considerable business interests in shipping, oil, and the financial sector. Despite recent reforms, restructuring, and purges, the involvement of military officers in the economy remains entrenched in Nigeria (Fayemi 2000) .
The reasons or motivations for military involvement in the economy vary across cases; however, there are some common international, political, and institutional explanations and patterns that can be identified comparatively in non-democratic regimes where the military is involved in economic activities regardless of region and degree of participation. The end of the Cold War was an important development for many armed forces. Traditional security and defense issues became less important while issues related to socio-economic development and economic reform climbed to the top of governmental agendas. As a result, armed forces faced severe budgetary shortfalls and cutbacks in personnel as governments' redirected resources into non-military activities to support economic reform programs. In other cases, such as Vietnam and Cuba, military budgets experienced a dramatic shortfall as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of subsidies and other important military assistance programs.
Consequently, many armed forces shifted roles and began to participate in agriculture and other limited forms of economic subsistence operations to compensate for lost budgetary allocations and to support the welfare of serving and retired military personnel. Other militaries with a history of involvement in economic and development activities, such as China, Cuba, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam have been pushed by their governments to become more commercially minded as they cope with dwindling defense budgets. In the aftermath of the Cold War when many non-democratic regimes faced internal and external pressures, the military's participation in commercial activities became part of the regime's survival strategy to "purchase" military support as it sought to either overcome a crisis or implement a series of politically dangerous economic reforms. A number of these armies have built up deeply entrenched commercial interests in key sectors of the economy such as tourism, telecommunications, banking, and transportation, making them influential economic actors. Obvious pathologies have emerged as a result of military entrepreneurialism such as corruption, contributing to the breakdown of professionalism, cohesion, and discipline.
Yet despite this widespread involvement and the ramifications for civil-military relations, research has virtually ignored the economic role of the military. As Peter Lock laments, "Given the scale of the pervasive involvement of the armed forces around the world, particularly of their higher ranks, in economic activities outside what one would consider their ideal-type mandate, it is astounding how little systematically collected information is available" (2000: 2).
This study begins to address this lacuna by examining the involvement of the military in the economy during processes of economic reform and liberalization in non-democratic systems. We argue that the nature of this involvement is guided by regime survival strategies. Specifically, under dire economic conditions that necessitate liberalization measures, regimes will attempt to promote military loyalty and political survival by minimizing or offsetting the negative effects of economic reform while maximizing positive dividends. Although specific survival strategies differ according to context, strategies include fostering military controlled businesses to offset budgetary losses, harnessing the technical skills of the military to promote reform (thus giving the military a central stake in the success of the process), creating business opportunities for key officers to maintain loyalty, or using selective purges to ensure the ascendancy of pro-reform officers. Precise strategies depend upon the capacity of the military as well as its earlier role in economic activities. Of course, reversals or changes are possible where military involvement in the economy begins to threaten regime survival. This paper examines China, Cuba, and Syria as case studies to demonstrate the centrality of the "survival imperative" in shaping the dynamics of military involvement in the economy under conditions of economic liberalization and reform. Regimes i n all three countries rely upon the support of the military for power, experienced a severe economic crisis that sparked some degree of liberalization and reform, and offered roles for the military in the economy. In each case, the regime attempted to shape the involvement of the military in the reform process to minimize potential opposition and maximize support for economic change. Given the geographic and cultural differences of the cases, this commonality highlights the importance of regime survival calculations in decisions about how to address the economic interests of the military in the context of crisis and change.
The PLA of China: From Peasant Army to Bingshang
The predecessor of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Red Army, came into being with the Nanchang uprising on 1 August 1927. On the basis of Mao Zedong's theory of "people's war," this revolutionary army was to have both a political and social role. In addition to politicalorganizational work, the Red Army was used as an economic resource as well. Red Army soldiers participated in food production (i.e., raising crops and livestock) to supplement reserves and feed the local population. Likewise, since its establishment in 1949, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been assigned number of social, political and economic functions beyond its traditional mission of defending the Chinese Communist Revolution. In China, as in virtually all Communist countries, the military plays a major political role. As a result, the Chinese leadership always considered the military's role as central to the regime's political and social campaigns deemed critical to the survival of the regime. During much of the Maoist period of revolutionary mobilization , when the regime, led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), relied on techniques of mass mobilization to purge real and imagined opponents of Mao Zedong, the military was o ften a leading socio-political actor helping the regime overcome the harmful economic and political effects of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Though it was the CCP and not the PLA that possessed the power and capacity to provide guidance during the mobilization campaigns, the active participation of the PLA in non-military tasks, such as in production during Great Leap Forward, for example, positioned the military as an ideological vanguard and its soldiers as model workers (Adelman 1980: 168-169) . Though the CCP was always the premier i nstitution, predating the PLA and its predecessor the Chinese l eadership always turned to the military to implement and ensure the success of Beijing's political, social or economic goals, partic ularly those considered vital to its survival.
When in the early 1980s, after Deng Xiaoping had consolidated political control and embarked on a massive process of modernization and economic reform with the help of the PLA, it was not the first time that the Chinese military had been called upon to play an important supporting role. The PLA has owned and operated enterprises since the late 1920s, but the roots of the Chinese military's role as an influential economic actor can be traced back nearly two thousand years (Hsiao 1978) . During imperial times, militaries were expected to be partially, if not fully, self-supporting i n order to relieve the central government of the burden of defense spending. Moreover, the military's economic activities, particularly in the area of farming, had the added objective of helping peasants in distant regions feed themselves which enhanced the prestige of the armed forces and central government. According to one analyst, the Imperial army's economic role was "an explicit model used by Mao and the Communist leadership to implement the PLA's enterprise system" (Bickford 1999 ).
Much like before, the impetus for the development of the PLA's economic activities was self-sufficiency and the need to support isolated Communist forces and sympathizers suffering from military attacks and attendant dire economic circumstances. Meeting the guerrilla army's needs was paramount. Units were often cut off from external supply sources for clothing, food and other essentials, and, therefore, had to rely on their own efforts to meet their basic needs.
Mao was the leading advocate of the military's involvement in production activities; he "regarded self-sufficiency as not only an essential means of survival for the Red Army but also politically virtuous as the military would not be a burden on the civilian population" (Cheung 2001, 17) .
The critical political goal was the latter, gain the goodwill of the people and ensure their cooperation without which the Red Army could not survive. It is also important to note that military production helped local economies by providing employment as well as critical goods and services to peasants. Mao used the military as an engine of growth; he pointed out that the PLA was "an i mpetus to the great production campaign of the people" (Cheung 2001, 20) . The Red Army's economic activities included running small industries, raising crops and livestock, and building factories, hospitals, and repair workshops to meet the needs of soldiers and their dependants as well as the local population. By the late 1940s, the Red Army had more over 500 military supply factories, managed over a thousand farms throughout the liberated areas, and owned hundreds of industrial and commercial operations (Selden 1995, chapter 6) . between 1966 between -1976 between (Lippit 1987 . T he structural and institutional characteristics of the command economy generated a number of inefficiencies that could only be overcome with a dramatic overhaul of the economic system in favor of liberalization. In the military, Deng pressed for far-reaching overhaul and streamlining of what he described as a bloated and inefficient army. Military budgets had to be drastically reduced. Between 1979 and 1981, the military budget was cut by more than 24 percent and manpower by nearly one million soldiers (Mulvenon 1999, 6) . As a way of compensating for this loss while exploiting the PLA's latent economic c apacity (i.e. "fifty years of experience with various types of economic production, a well developed and exploitable military logistics infrastructure, ranging from transportation to factories and farms, and the deeply-ingrained socialization among the ranks and top officials that production was an acceptable military task"), Deng urged the armed forces to play a larger role in his massive campaign of economic reform and modernization, including taking part in commercial ventures. One of the key reasons given as to why the armed forces should take part in business and assist the process of modernization was that "national wealth would be increased and the government's program of the Four Modernization would be boosted" (Cheung 2001: 28) . In short, declining budgets and personnel along with the need for the PLA's technical/logistical skills during this period were part of Deng's plan to save money, streamline inefficient industries and organizations, and gain political support for his reforms (Folta 1992) .
As military budgets continued to decline after 1985, Deng issued directives allowing the army to organize commercial enterprises totally unrelated to military interests. These included real estate development, financial institutions, nightclubs, hotels, foodstuffs, textiles, pharmaceuticals, mining and transportation; all industries and conglomerates under the supervision of the PLA's General Logistics Department (GLD). In effect, Deng "bought off" the military by expanding the scope of its permissible economic activities, allowing the institution to gain a larger profile and stake in Deng's modernization efforts (Joffe 1987) . Business opportunities offered the only meaningful way to boost living standards and maintain morale, according to Deng and his supporters.
In the beginning, military chiefs opposed having the military involved so massively in economic activities. They believed that Deng's market reforms and the PLA's growing businessoriented pursuits would undermine cohesion and combat readiness leading to corruption and disciplinary problems. However, once Deng had a firm hold over the military, he urged the chiefs to lead the economic charge pointing out that "engagement in business is an important mission for our army in the new historical era. Protecting the army's living standards and alleviating the state's burden is of important significance." The generals, realizing the lucrative opportunities, promised that the PLA would be the "escort and protector" of Deng's economic reforms (Cheung 2001, 48) . As Chinese military analyst Tai Ming Cheung (2001, 171) concludes, "by getting the PLA involved in business, Deng was able to ensure that the military's interests became closely intertwined with his own policy goals." Military support, particularly in the early 1980s and 1990s, when his reforms were under intense criticism from conservative elements, was vital to inaugurating and reviving Deng's economic reform process.
By 1989 the number of military enterprises had grown to nearly 15,000 with yearly profits of between $2-3 billion, and employed an estimated 700,000 full-time workers in 1990 (Ding 1993, 88) . At the height of military commercialism, PLA companies and conglomerates, such as the Poly Group (arms trading, free trade zones, and tourism-real estate), Xinxing Group (foreign trade activities), Songliao Group (automobiles), and Sanju Enterprise Group (pharmaceuticals, agriculture, tourism and real estate), amounted to 20,000 enterprises exporting nearly $4 billion of goods and generating profits of $7-10 billion a year (Bickford 1990; Solomone 1995) . The PLA's business operations contributed to the national economy in numerous ways; sharing profits with the national government and local populations, creating jobs, expanding the production of goods and services for the civilian economy while increasing the efficiency of distribution (Joffe 1995) .
It is estimated that PLA operations contributed more than half of its profits to the national government and civilian economy and provided 20 percent of good and services consumed by local populations. Despite these rewards to the national economy, certain drawbacks began to appear. What began as an attempt to increase revenue to compensate for reduced military appropriations turned into an opportunity for enrichment for the institution and its officers. By the early 1990s, self-sufficiency and support for reform, initial motivations for the military's economic role, were replaced by the drive for profits.
The critical role played by PLA units in quashing the June 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square made the leadership realize that corruption in the military was a much smaller price to pay than a disloyal army unwilling to protect the regime. In other words, the calamitous events of 1989 enhanced the political role and profile of the PLA making it a key institution of regime stability and survival (Gregor 1991; Lin 1992) . Although Beijing restructured some PLA companies to clean up and halt freewheeling spending, there was no effort to divest the military from its business operations. In 1992, after a trip to Southern China, Deng announced an immediate return to rapid and bold economic reforms calling on the PLA to lead the campaign.
As a result, profits from PLA operations increased nearly 20 percent in 1993 while the number of military enterprises expanded, according to some analyst, to more than 20,000 spreading across just about every major sector of the Chinese economy.
By the end of 1993 there was a serious concern within the PLA and CCP that money-making was contributing to rampant corruption (specifically smuggling and speculation) and to undermining military cohesion and professionalism (Cheung 1994) . Since the mid-1980s, PLA and CCP chiefs warned that the new military economy was severely compromising the ability of the armed forces to carry out its duties but political and economic priorities exceeded these warnings; however, the rapid expansion of the military's commercial ventures between 1991 and 1993, accelerated and deepened the institutional problems associated with bingshang-soldiers in business-to a degree judged by some in the Chinese leadership to be a threat to national security (Mora 2002a) . The PLA had been a key bastion of ideological support to the Communist regime, but its involvement in business led to the spread of corrosive political and social influences at all levels of the military hierarchy (Mulvenon 1998) . The rampant growth of corruption in China was a by-product of market reforms that resulted in a dramatic change in culture from the ethos of discipline, asceticism and Puritanism that characterized the Maoist era to one of materialism, individualism, and status (Kwong 1997) . The Chinese military was particularly hard-hit by the vices triggered by its massive participation in Deng's economic reform and modernization policy (Goodman 1996) . One of the biggest scandals ( centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, and esprit de corps (Cheung 2001, 58; Mulvenon 1998, 12-21) . Rectification campaigns had some success, but deeply entrenched institutional and personal interest made it quite difficult for the leadership to sever the military's ties to its business complex. Unprecedented autonomy from civilian leadership due to reduced dependency on budgetary allocations from the government, and the potential outcomerefusal of the military leadership to follow government orders that may impinge on its economic interests-presented the CCP with a political challenge (Paltiel 1995).
In the mid-1990s several directives were issued to enhance transparency and accountability of PLA enterprises in effort to improve oversight and political control. These efforts had mixed Since before the triumph of the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese military has been asked to assume critically important economic roles considered by the leadership to be central to China's economic well being and regime survival. This was particularly true when the leadership faced crisis situations or decided to embark upon a major campaign or restructuring of the economy and society. In the 1980s as the military's mission focused on supporting Deng's economic reform and modernization program, the PLA's political profile and economic stake increased considerably, but so did fears that bingshang was adversely affecting national defense and the new leadership headed by Jiang Zemin. By the mid-1990s, regime stability and survival was no longer strictly defined in terms of economic reform and development, but with respect to strategic and political goals as articulated by the post-Deng leadership. Purging the military of its vices and refocusing its mission on military-security objectives meant divesting the PLA from its business operations and the strengthening of political control by the new civilian leadership.
The FAR of Cuba: From Civic to Entrepreneurial Soldier
The Cuban armed forces have been an important pillar of Fidel Castro's revolutionary struggle and regime since before he came to power in 1959. The institution embodied the historical myths and origins of the revolutionary struggle as well as the values, desires and ideology of its foundational revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro; the FAR was the Revolution's vanguard, the preeminent institution in the early stages of the revolutionary process (Karol 1970; Judson 1984) . Unlike the PRC and Soviet bloc communist regimes, the Revolutionary Armed In 1986 Fidel Castro announced the Rectification Process which was a defensive response to perestroika and glasnost in the USSR, reinforcing the military-mobilizational approach to a wide range of social, political, economic and eventually, military challenges. In other words, the centrality of the charismatic -mobilizational authority of Fidel Castro was stressed as a means of recapturing the r evolutionary spirit and enthusiasm that had been lost as a result of institutionalization, and, in the case of the military, professionalization (Perez-Stable 1999) .
From an economic standpoint, rectific ation attempted to concentrate economic decision-making in the hands of the state and did away with the few existing market-oriented mechanisms (such as farmer's markets), and used moral incentives to motivate workers. The goal of economic restructuring and "institutional rectific ation and purification" during this period of intense crisis and uncertainty caused by reforms in the USSR and the winding down of the Cold War, was to secure the survival of the regime against any real or potential internal or external threat. The ideological and economic crisis of the late 1980s placed enormous pressure on the Castro regime leading to a series of dramatic events and changes in policies, particularly in the FAR.
As Moscow decided to phase out all subsidies and aid to Cuba, amounting to about $5 billion a year, and restructure its trade relationship with the island economy, Cuba's principal source of imports, technology, petroleum, spare parts, and markets for its exports suddenly With respect to the military, this period of economic and ideological crisis and uncertainty had two major consequences. The first was the arrest, show trial and execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa, a decorated Hero of the Republic, in 1989 on charges of corruption (Oppenheimer 1992; Alonso 1995) . This unprecedented event "signaled a critical moment in the history of revolutionary Cuba and of the regime's relationship with its armed forces." The Ochoa trial offered an opportunity for the regime to reassert control and weaken the prestige and autonomy obtained by the institution after years of professionalization and internationalism. The execution of Ochoa and subsequent purges underscores the existence of tensions associated with the return of combat-weary and Soviet trained veterans from Angola. However, more importantly, the Ochoa case was "a convenient shorthand for a wider and much more complex official attempt to resolve several crises confronting the regime simultaneously," specifically in the area of civil-military relations (Baloyra 1989 The second critical effect of the economic crisis on the military which led to its restructuring was the government's decision to downsize the FAR's budget and personnel to meet the requirements of the Special Period. The military implemented the so-called zero-option which consisted of an "intensive effort undertaken for a wholly autarkic existence… conserving material and equipment, which, along with self sufficiency and readiness is one of the FAR's three main goals" (Walker 1997, 70 (Mora 2002a, 198) . As in China, the dramatic decline in budget, troops and equipment in the early 1990s, a result of the disappearance of Soviet military aid and the crisis of the Cuban economy, forced the regime and the military to find a new mission and means to compensate for the loss of Soviet largesse while contributing to the national economy.
Specifically, the FAR adopted a plan of self-sufficiency, particularly in the area of agriculture and production of consumer goods. By 1993, the FAR covered 50 percent of its expenditures with funds generated from its own units. In other words, the armed forces sought to generate foreign exchange so as to be able to sustain itself as a military force without being a load on the state or a burden on the rest of the economy. By the mid-1990s, the focus of the regime's plan was to have the military contribute substantively to turning the economy around. In short, since the late 1980s, military goals have emphasized institutional self-sufficiency and help in producing and distributing much needed agricultural goods and services.
As a result of these material and political c hallenges to the military and society, the leadership turned, as it did in the early 1960s, to the armed forces in a campaign to protect the revolution by contributing its expertise and manpower to mending and restructuring the economy.
When in 1991 Castro stated that, "one of the tasks of the armed forces is to help the economy of the country during the Special Period," and Raul Castro asserted in 1993, in reference to the military's mission, "beans are more important than cannons," it was clear that the future role of the post-internationalist FAR had been defined. Raul went on to say that, "the principal economic, political, ideological and military responsibility of the FAR is to continue enhancing the efficiency in production, particularly foodstuffs and sugar" (Nuevo Herald 1993, 1). Once the FAR had been reorganized and control by the revolutionary leadership reasserted, the military once again became the trusted institution and was given a decisive responsibility in helping the regime weather what was arguably the most difficult period since beginning of the Revolution. In other words, the technical capabilities of a "cleansed" and disciplined institution, under the authority of Raul Castro, contributed to the regime's decision to rely on the FAR in implementing Raul's proposal for economic modernization. The leadership had to rely on the FAR because all other institutions, the PCC above all, were failing to perform. The absence of a civil society and independent entrepreneurs placed the burden of the economy on the military. There was simply to societal alternative. As one Latin American diplomat based in Havana aptly described in 1995, "reality of Cuba in 1995 is that the military is one of the few, if not the only, institution that really and truly work. Revolutionary fervor has vanished, and with it the credibility of the party, leaving only the armed forces to fill the vacuum" (Rohter 1995, 12 (Amuchastegui 1999; Leon 1995) . According to Cuban officials, SPE's goal is to "increase maximum competition and efficiency of the base power, and establish the accounting and managerial principles, policies and procedures that propel the development of innovation, creativity and the responsibility of all managers and workers" (Mastrapa 2000) . In the end, the SPE had three main objectives; (1) to promote greater self-sufficiency in the FAR in light of the end of Soviet assistance; (2) i ncrease efficiency and productivity in military factories producing uniforms, small arms and consumer goods; and (3) provide a model that could be adopted elsewhere in the economy (Latell 2003) . 2 As a result of this new mission, the FAR increasingly perceives itself as the savior of Cuba, the "driving force that makes things work with paradigmatic self-reliance, and a record of fulfilling its commitments in the field of industry, agriculture and so on" (Leon 1995 slightly, the levels of production and efficiency of the civilian economy.
As with the PLA, the FAR's economic role is fraught with potential dangers. As Paul Buchanan (1995, 3-4) warns, business activities bring with them risks "that many officers will be come less wedded to socialism and develop and independent entrepreneurial spirit. As a result, this might cause an ideological schism within the ranks," and weaken the cohesion, combat preparedness and orientation of officers. Military data is hard to come by. The duration, depth and breadth of economic reforms and military involvement, though clearly growing, is such that the consequences of the FAR's commercial activities have yet to fully develop, despite some anecdotal evidence that indicates that with relatively easy access to dollars, fuel, food and vehicles, corruption is increasing (Mora 2002b) . 3 The truth is that at this time we do not know the full effect of the FAR's involvement. As Espinosa and Harding (2000) have suggested, it could go either way, "the question remains whether these economic activities increase loyalty and cohesion of the FAR and the regime, or whether it promote individualism, capitalist ambitions, and regime disloyalty." One thing is clear; by running its own enterprises, the FAR contributes to the national economy, ensures its own budget, and maintains a decent standard of living for its officers-always a key to military loyalty. The top brass is solidly behind the new economic role and the lower-ranking officers are gradually gaining from the FAR's new direction. As Juan del Aguila (1998, 675) indicates, "a new class of military entrepreneurs has emerged. Their increasing d ependence and focus on these ventures… is raising the military's stake in the regime's survival." Finally, the FAR's enhanced economic influence and profile has translated into some political power. Its overwhelming centrality in key areas of policymaking, particularly those deemed by the regime leadership to be pivotal to its survival (i.e. economy and security), and benefits accrued from its commercial activities, has increased its standing and stake in the regime since the traumatic events surrounding the end of the Cold War and the Ochoa affair. As in the 1960s, the expansion of the military's responsibilities has placed the FAR, once again, as the central pillar of regime survival.
The Syrian Military:
In 1963 From 1977 From -1988 , military spending (including Soviet arms transfers) was estimated at 30% of GDP, and the army (including reserves) employed 21% of the male labor force (Hinnebusch 1998: 227) . The high levels of spending attracted strategic rents from regional sponsors who sought to support Syria as a frontline state in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other Arab governments helped finance the Syrian military "because of Syria's strategic position and its military credibility, that is, its constant preparation for war" (Perthes 2000: 158) .
The war preparation dividend in the 1980s and 1990s is estimated at $12-13 million, or 5-6% of GDP (Ibid).
Over time, the military developed business interests and activities as a result of its political influence and control of economic resources. This included Mu'assasat al-Iskan al'Askari (Milihouse), the Constructions Organization (MATA'), the Medical Industries Organization, the Military Social Organization, and the Military Housing Organization, all affiliated with the Ministry of Defense (Ayubi 1995: 276, 288 , fn 2; Richards and Waterbury 1997: 341) . Through these and other organizations, the military gained control of important economic sectors and industries r elated to "public works, construction, basic industry, farm production, and the manufacture of batteries, bottled mineral water, and furniture" (Richards and Waterbury 1997: 341) . The political importance of the military generated preferential treatment and quasimonopolies in business. Much of this wealth has been produced as a result of political privileges rather than productive activities, and a number of examples highlight the ability of officers to translate coercive power into individual wealth. First, key military officers benefited from currency manipulations. The regime pegged the lira to different exchange rates and banned foreign currency, but connected individuals could purchase dollars at the official exchange rate and sell them at a profit at the open-market rate (Robinson 1998: 163; Gambill 2001) . Second, officers benefited from favorable taxation practices. In particular, corrupt custom regulations provided opportunities for regime loyalists to skim off taxes. The result is that although the custom rate is exceedingly high, much of it (approximately $1 billion a year) is siphoned before it reaches the treasury (Gambill 2001) . T hird, officers were given generous subsidies for housing and consumer goods and r eceived preferential treatment by the bureaucracy, which can either facilitate or delay permits for economic activities (Gambill 2000a) . And fourth, government monopoly in the banking sector created opportunities for politically inspired loans and interest rates that advantaged individuals with ties to the regime (Gambill 2001: 4) . Many of these privileges still continue today. real wage declines, and a scarcity of goods all signaled the severity of the crisis and the necessity of new policies (Hinnebusch 1995: 312) .
In 1991, Hafez al-Assad launched an economic liberalization program to pull the country out of the economic crisis. 4 The cornerstone of the reforms was the new Investment Law, which was intended to encourage international investment and the repatriation of $60 billion held by Syrians abroad (see Pölling 1994) . Implementation was uneven, and at the end of the 1990s Nestlé was the only multi-national to invest in the country (Robinson 1998: 162) . The regime, however, signaled a desire to expand reforms to other areas of economic activity, including banking and currency exchange.
The direction of reforms challenged the economic interests of the old guard in the military, who depended upon favoritism, the political control of resources, and a non-competitive economic environment. Officers associated with the early days of the regime, in particular, had produced their wealth through patronage rather than business operations. As a result, liberalization threatened their ability to accumulate wealth through non-productive economic activities, such as currency manipulation. Although intra-regime politicking is often opaque, it is generally recognized in Syria that this old guard is spearheading opposition to economic reform.
The regime has thus found itself in a political bind: its survival depends upon the continued loyalty of the military officer corps, yet its ability to provide the necessary patronage to sustain this loyalty requires economic reforms that are antithetical to many key officers.
The regime responded to the dilemma by marginalizing elements of the military opposed to access, favorable treatment, and profits (Haddad 2002: 225) . And there are a number of active duty officers directly involved in running business enterprises, including Manaf Tlas, the son of the Minister of Defense (Haddad 2002: 243, fn. 285 ).
In addition, a few businesses affiliated with the Ministry of Defense are positioned to take advantage of economic reforms. In particular, the continuing ability of the military to gain access to low cost inputs allows its businesses to underbid other companies in a liberalized economy. It is rumored, for example, that Milihouse secured a major contract from an American based hotel chain because of its special access to cheap building materials, which allowed it to significantly underbid its competitors. 5 Such advantages could place military businesses at the cutting edge of liberalization.
The regime has attempted to empower these elements of the military by selectively liberalizing particular areas of the country and economy to benefit pro-reform officers and businesses. As Hector Schamis (1999) argues, leaders can overcome the political obstacles to economic r eform by forming alliances with pro-reform groups, reshaping regime coalition 5 Conversation with Fred Lawson, March 2003. interests through sele ctive rent-seeking opportunities, and generally empowering the winners of the reform process (also see Etchemendy 2001) . This seems to be Bashar's strategy. The import of particular products, for example, is banned outside a "free zone" that is controlled by Bashar's cousins (Gambill 2001: 4) . In a political move to shore up support from the traditional Alawi strongholds, the regime has also targeted the tourism industry as an engine of liberalized growth (see Hopfinger and Khadour 1999) . The primary tourism investments are in Latakia province, which is dominated by Alawites. In July 2000, a consortium of Saudi and Syrian investors announced a plan to build a $40 million five-star hotel (Gambill 2000b) . The Syrian Ministry of Tourism itself has spent $100 million building a base for tourism in Latakia (Gambill 2001) .
These investments will create infrastructure, provide jobs, and raise real estate values to the benefit of Alawite business owners and traditional regime loyalists. Wealthy military officers (almost all Alawis) are well situated to take advantage of any growth in tourism.
In addition, although the regime recently issued a decree in January 2001 that allows foreign banks to operate in the country, regulations provide restrictions that advantage regime allies. In partic ular, at least 51% of all banks must be owned by Syrian nationals or companies and 25% of all shares must be controlled by Syrians. Syrian shares and control will most likely be granted according to political loyalty, rather than competitive market pressures. In many areas of liberalization such as these, cronyism will benefit loyal military officers through sele ctive reforms (see Haddad 1999: 26) .
At the same time, however, the regime is not relying exclusively on a narrow alliance with pro-reform military elements. Bashar has instead opted to broaden his coalition by incorporating other winners of the reform process. Specifically, the regime has moved to off-set resistance from anti-reform members of its coalition by granting business actors greater access and influence in policy making. As Hinnebusch (2000: 137) observes, "if military or bureaucratic interests or the ruling party resist economic liberalization, an opening to the bourgeoisie allows the elite to co-opt and channel their countervailing influence on behalf of postpopulist strategies; diversifying their coalitions enables elites to balance above these competing interests and to steer a course that suits them."
This opening has provided new opportunities for bourgeoisie political influence. In the 1990
parliamentary elections, two members of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce and one from the Aleppo chamber were elected, the first representatives of the business community since 1963 (Heydemann 1993: 93) . The parliament eventually included ten millionaires and a bloc of independent merchants and industrialists (Hinnebusch 1998: 235) . The Chambers of Commerce became increasingly powerful institutions and gained access to cabinet decision-making. In 
Conclusion
In each of the cases, the military's role in non-defense missions was, to one degree or another, enhanced during a period of economic crisis and readjustment caused by the end of the Cold War, the loss of Soviet assistance, declining oil prices, and/or the pressures of globalization.
Given the centrality of the military to regime survival, responses to the crisis necessitated including the military in economic reform. In China and Cuba, for example, the military has a long tradition of involvement in social and economic missions and a reputation as a loyal and technically capable institution. As a result, the leadership viewed it as the only entity capable of implementing key economic reforms. In addition, the regime in both countries trusted that the military could help overcome the immense challenges associated with external and internal crises and the attendant domestic consequences resulting from economic reform and regime adjustment.
In Syria, the military was not so much a vehicle of reform as a potential obstacle to liberalization that could threaten the reform process. As a result, the regime fostered pro-reform elements in the military while marginalizing reform opponents. Although the cases vary in terms of the pace and depth of economic reform (China being the most profound, followed by Cuba and then Syria) and the nature of military involvement (institutional in China and Cuba and more individual and clientelistic in Syria), in all three cases the military is an important pillar of the regime's new coalition and policy (i.e. economic reform) for survival.
In China, in the early 1980s as Deng Xiaoping sought to address the country's desperate social and economic conditions through economic reform and modernization, the leadership turned to the military as an institution capable of serving the new policy goal through downsizing and mission change. Until the late 1990s, the military's role and contribution to the economy and its profile and stake in Deng's economic reforms grew dramatically. As a result, the PLA's commercial enterprises became some of the most efficient and profitable industries in China. By the mid 1990s, the military had effectively fulfilled the mission given by Deng in the early 1980s-it had helped ensure the regime's survival by devoting much of its expertise, talent, and resources to economic reform. In the late 1990s, however, the new leadership under President Jiang Zemin became concerned that the military's business complex was too extensive and threatened the i nstitution's professionalism, discipline, and war-fighting capacity. As a result, he began divesting the military from its business interests.
The Cuban military was always the most important institution in Revolutionary Cuba.
Regardless of the task, the FAR was the institution of choice for the regime's social and political experiments because of its revolutionary credentials and technical and organizational capacity.
At a critical moment after the end of the Cold War and Soviet economic assistance, it was, therefore, not a surprise that the regime asked the military to assume a leadership role in economic r eform. Not since the early 1960s, when the Cuban civic -soldier took on key administrative and social roles, had the FAR's role in regime survival been so critical. As the sole guarantor of the reform's success and thus the regime's survival, the military's profile and stake in the economy was heightened. The military's predominant presence in Cuba's most important and dynamic economic sector, tourism, placed the institution at the center of Fidel Castro's regime in the post-Cold War period.
In Syria prior to economic liberalization in the early 1990s, individual officers used their personal connections to the Assad regime to generate wealth through non-productive (and often illegal) activities. Because regime survival was contingent upon neo-patrimonial networks and the loyalty of the officer corps, economic pay-offs that targeted key military personalities and agencies helped solidify allegiances and critical support. While some officers continued to rely upon non-productive enrichment, others sought private partners in the business community to develop new investment opportunities. This latter officer group used its connections to guarantee preferential access to resources and markets, thereby positioning itself to dominate competition in newly liberalized sectors of the economy. Pressed by a dramatic economic crisis that necessitated reforms, the Syrian regime facilitated the economic interests of these officers while concomitantly marginalizing elements of the old guard who were opposed to liberalization.
This paper demonstrates that the regimes in all three cases selectively encouraged (or discouraged) military involvement in the economy and economic reform to foster continued regime survival. The specific dynamics of this involvement, however, differs according to the local context and consequent survival calculus. This paper suggests some variables to explain this variance, which could be used to examine other cases: 1) patterns of military economic activity prior to liberalization; 2) the type of regime (communist versus neo-patrimonial, for example); 3) the unity of economic interests within the officer corps; and 4) the nature and depth of the economic crisis. These are intended only as a starting point for broader comparative analysis, but they suggest important concepts and causal mechanisms that could be used to explore hypotheses and organize new empirical research.
